Dazed and Confused on Libya
Liberals and conservatives alike have begun to criticize President Obama’s sluggish handling of the crisis in Libya. A growing chorus of Americans is anxious for the Administration to take decisive action, or at least articulate a plan. The situation is growing more dire every day, and our window of opportunity to push out Qadhafi or prevent a massacre may be closing.
Candidate Obama promised us a different decision-making style than his predecessor, and boy has he delivered on that. Instead of a President who acts decisively based at times on gut reactions, we have a President who deliberates interminably, particularly when it comes to foreign and defense policy. That may be fine sometimes, but it is a recipe for failure in the face of fast-unfolding events in the Middle East. Moreover, it gives the impression of an American President who is in over his head.
Yes, this is complicated stuff, and the pros and cons must be fully considered. But weeks into the crisis, American leadership continues to be lacking. Most distressingly, each day that goes by seems to strengthen Qadhafi’s position. The effect of our inaction, then, is not neutral but actually detrimental to our own stated goals, not to mention the well-being of the Libyan people.
The President’s public statements on Libya have articulated two goals of U.S. policy: first, to stop Qadhafi’s violence toward his people, and more ambitiously, to remove him from office. Yet the United States appears unwilling to back up those words with action. Should Qadhafi prevail, tyrants around the world will learn that American threats need not be taken seriously. We’ll also have to keep dealing with the Mad Man of the Middle East, who’ll be madder than ever.
Even more difficult to understand is why the Obama Administration has limited its own options for dealing with the crisis. A no-fly-zone, the Administration says, must be authorized by the UN Security Council and conducted by NATO. This makes it all but impossible, because of Russian, Chinese, and Turkish resistance. Arming the rebels, the Administration says, is illegal because of the UN arms embargo. Yet, as Senators McCain (R-AZ) and Lieberman (I-CT) have noted, the embargo can reasonably be understood to apply only to the Libyan government.
The Obama Administration will point to certain actions, including sanctions, a travel ban, humanitarian relief, and the UN arms embargo. But while commendable, these are far from sufficient. The economic effect of sanctions will only be felt over time. As for the travel ban on Qadhafi and his comrades, it has not altered Qadhafi’s ambitions. He’ll be disinclined to leave anyhow, because the UN Security Council’s decision to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court means he’ll probably face arrest. And yet, wouldn’t Libya be a better place if he did leave? Wouldn’t that actually accomplish America’s stated goals?
Two factors help explain the paralysis of the Obama Administration.
First is its flawed view of international organizations. Another Obama campaign promise was to take a more multilateral approach, a reasonable strategy. Unfortunately, the Administration fails to realize that an organization is only as good as the sum of its members. A majority of United Nations members are not free countries. The organization is dominated by a G-77 mentality that pits the so-called underdeveloped world against the developed. Russia and China, two countries notorious for repressing their own citizens, wield vetoes at the Security Council. Last May, the General Assembly elected Libya to the Human Rights Council, and while it recently voted to remove Libya, Syria appears to be next in line for membership. The United Nations is a useful forum for international diplomacy and consensus-building – a water cooler for diplomats – but we should not be stunned into inaction when our interests are opposed there.
The Administration’s achievements on Libya at the UN themselves raise questions. If the Administration really believes the arms embargo limits our ability put “every option on the table,” why did we not clarify that it should apply only to the Libyan government? Why did we refer Qadhafi to the International Criminal Court, to which we are not even a party, rather than working first to see him held accountable by the Libyan people?
A second reason for the Administration’s hesitancy is anxiety about our perception on the Arab Street. Certainly we don’t want to discredit the Libyan opposition by our involvement. We should not conflate a domestic outcry for freedom into a confrontation between Islam and the West. The best way to counter this is to work with likeminded countries, understanding that unanimity is impossible. We also need to recognize that as the days go by, our very inaction may hurt our standing among the Arab reformers whose cries for democracy we claim to support. We may well be damned if we do, damned if we don’t. In that case, it’s better to be on the right side of history.
Looking at the options currently being discussed, a no-fly-zone is indeed a provocative move, and seems unlikely to be decisive in the struggle. Pro-Qadhafi forces are committing plenty of atrocities on the ground that our pilots would be powerless to stop. Moreover, these air assaults tend to make use of helicopters, which are difficult to shoot down. Historically, no-fly-zones failed to prevent the slaughter at Srebrenica or accelerate Saddam Hussein’s ouster.
However, we cannot ignore the pleas of rebel leaders and the Arab League for a no-fly-zone. If we have willing partners to share the burden, we should not wait for UN approval that may never materialize. Liberals should bear in mind that the no-fly-zone established over Yugoslavia during the Clinton Administration did not have UN Security Council approval.
More likely to actually tip the scales would be covert assistance to help the rebels overcome their military disadvantages. Critics will say we don’t know who the opposition is, but that is no longer the case. Many Libyan diplomats have already defected and are working with the rebels. A 31-member Libyan Transitional National Council has been formed, complete with a leader, spokesman, and ministers of defense and foreign relations. Acknowledging that a recent British mission to reach out to the rebels was a bit of a fiasco, the fact remains that the Libyan opposition has a face and has asked for help. Surely with the right advance work we can help them level the playing field.
While refusing to take any options off the table, we should articulate that it must be the Libyan people who fight. Any assistance is due to the unique nature of Qadhafi and the situation in Libya, and not interpreted as a promise to every opposition group in the world.
Three kinds of assistance are needed. First, we should provide the rebels with weapons to hold their own against Qadhafi’s forces. Above all, the rebels need weapons to penetrate tanks and defend against helicopters. Since many of their forces are defectors from the military, it will not be terribly difficult to provide training.
A second need of the Libyan opposition is communications. Qadhafi has blocked the Internet and cell phones. We can help the rebels establish a secure communications network so they can better command and control their own troops. We can jam the regime’s communications. And in Libya and throughout the world the U.S. can and should do more to help people overcome government restrictions on the Internet.
Finally, we should share intelligence with the rebels about Libyan troop movements. NATO’s increased overflights will give us a better picture of what is going on. Sharing information in real-time can help save lives.
Let us not be naïve: aiding the rebels through a no-fly-zone or other measures is risky, and not something to be taken lightly. The Administration must consult with members of Congress from both parties before and during such operations. We need to be constantly vigilant that our assistance not fall into the hands of al Qaeda or other radicals. We should continue to work with likeminded allies.
Every day that passes, the costs of our inactivity grow. As risky as it may be to help the rebels, the risk of a Qadhafi victory is far worse.
